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CONCEPTUAL SEMANTICS 
AS GROUNDED IN PERSONAL 
EXPERIENCE*
abstract
Semantic memory for an object encompasses multi-modal knowledge gained through personal experience 
over the lifetime, and coded in grounded sensory-motor brain systems, independently of the level of 
subjective awareness. Linguistic access to semantic memories in verbal format relies on the functional 
coupling between perisylvian language regions and the grounded brain systems implied by our 
lifetime experience with the concept’s referents. Linguistic structure exerts modulatory influences on 
this functional coupling, as in the case of sentential negation, which reduces the interactions between 
perisylvian language regions and the grounded brain systems.
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CONCEPTUAL SEMANTICS AS GROUNDED IN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
Semantic memory encompasses all the knowledge acquired over the lifetime and stored in 
a generalized form, independently of the actual time and space (Patterson et al., 2007). The 
content of semantic knowledge enables a wide variety of human actions, from the ability to 
move, perceive and interact with the external world, to higher cognitive functions including 
the possibility to speak, plan and decide (Binder & Desai, 2011). The nature of conceptual 
representations, and in particular their relation with sensory and motor experiences, has 
long constituted a matter of debate, which dates back to Greek philosophers. Rationalist 
philosophers have traditionally been skeptical about the role of perceptual experience in 
shaping conceptual knowledge, asserting that veridical knowledge is only gained through 
reason and is based on the existence of a priori categories, independently from external 
sources of information. On the other hand, Empiricist philosophers have strongly rejected 
this assumption, stating that concepts are strictly based upon sensory experience (Markie, 
2017). In the last decades, this debate has been revitalized by contrasting neuroscientific 
theories of semantic memory (Binder & Desai, 2011). At one extreme are disembodied or 
amodal theories, which propose a complete separation between perception and cognition. 
At the other extreme are grounded cognition and embodied theories, which assume that a 
common system underlies both sensory-motor and conceptual-semantic representations. As 
for the latter class of theories, Barsalou (1999, 2008) argued that the neural states subtending 
perception are stored in long-term semantic memory as modal symbols for external referents. 
Such perceptual symbols originate in all modalities of experience, including vision, gustation, 
olfaction, haptics, audition, proprioception, and introspection, and are thought to be 
distributed throughout the brain. As Wernicke affirmed more than a century ago (1874):
…the memory images of a bell… are deposited in the cortex and located according to the 
sensory organs. These would then include the acoustic imagery aroused by the sound 
of the bell, visual imagery established by means of form and color, tactile imagery 
acquired by cutaneous sensation, and finally, motor imagery gained by exploratory 
movements of the fingers and eyes (p.117). 
Rather than being fixed, the subsequent re-activation of a perceptual symbol is endowed 
with a dynamical organization through which, for example, different contexts may bias the 
neural activity towards some properties more than others (Barsalou 1999, 2008). Following 
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and the existence of amodal systems appears to be redundant, given that perceptual symbols 
provide both sensory and cognitive representations of external referents. A major objection 
moved to grounded cognition theories concerns the lack of compelling evidence able to 
demonstrate the causal role of the grounding mechanisms in concepts representation (Mahon 
& Caramazza, 2008). For instance, numerous findings reporting sensory-motor brain activity 
during conceptual processing offer support to the central claims of grounded cognition 
theories, but are nevertheless consistent with disembodied theories as well (Caramazza, 
2014). Authors supporting this latter class of theories claim that it is ultimately unknown 
whether the activity in sensory-motor cortices follows or rather anticipates the access to 
symbolic representations (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). From this perspective, sensory and 
motor brain activation merely accompanies and is epiphenomenal to conceptual processing, 
which is instead amodal and symbolic. One of the arguments in support of the amodal view 
emerges from neuropsychological data, in that impairments connected with objects usage 
(e.g., apraxia) are not necessarily paralleled by corresponding impairments in conceptual 
knowledge related to either the objects or their functional properties (Mahon & Caramazza, 
2005; Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016). In contrast to both strictly embodied and disembodied 
theories, other models propose that modality-specific brain areas interact with one or more 
amodal abstract systems during semantic processing. Among these models, Damasio and 
colleagues proposed that multiple convergence zones exist and are differentially engaged 
depending on the specific conceptual domains and contextual constraints (A. Damasio, 1989; 
H. Damasio et al., 1996). Convergence zones are defined as amodal regions, in that they do not 
map information in an embodied or feature-based manner (i.e. preserving sensory-motor 
patterns of experience), but they nonetheless strictly interact with sensory-motor cortices 
and prompt their co-activation through back-projections. More generally, the central function 
of high-level convergence zones is to unify the representations gained through different 
modalities, such as visual shape and action-related properties of tools. A related, yet different, 
proposal is the hub-and-spoke model (Rogers et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2007). At least two 
main factors differentiate the two models: firstly, the convergence zone model suggests 
the existence of multiple convergence zones in semantic processing; secondly, it implies a 
differential activation in these areas based on differences in stimuli and tasks requests. The 
hub-and-spoke model assumes that concepts are mainly assembled through the contribution 
of multimodal experiences encoded in widespread modality-selective brain areas. Crucially, 
a single trans-modal hub, placed bilaterally in the anterior temporal lobes (ATLs), integrates 
these sources of information. In this view, the spokes, or units, generate several inputs, which 
all converge to the ATLs, where they are assembled into an unified semantic concept. As 
direct prediction of the hub-and-spoke model, damage to the ATLs hub should determine a 
general semantic impairment, which is neither dependent of the input or output modalities 
(i.e. pictures, words, sounds), nor limited to a specific semantic category (i.e. animals, 
tools) (Lambon Ralph & Patterson, 2008). This idea is strengthened by clinical observation 
that patients with semantic dementia, associated with atrophy and hypo-metabolism in 
anterior temporal regions (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011), show a consistent pattern of deficits 
across modalities, stimuli types, response modalities, and tasks. However, new evidence has 
prompted a slight revision of the original hub-and-spoke model, with the ventrolateral ATL 
assuming the role of the hub core-component (Rice et al., 2015; Lambon Ralph et al., 2017). 
For instance, cytoarchitectonic studies revealed a graded variation in function and structure 
within the anterior temporal lobe (Ding et al., 2009) that matches differences in functional 
connectivity (Pascual et al., 2013) and structural white matter connectivity (Binney et al., 
2012) patterns across ATL sub-regions. Moreover, neuroimaging studies reported that the 
ventrolateral ATL activates strongly in semantic tasks, irrespectively of input or output 
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modalities or stimuli category (Spitsyna et al., 2006; Visser et al., 2012). A further related model 
of semantic memory is the so called “embodied abstraction” (Binder & Desai, 2011; Kiefer 
& Pulvermüller, 2012), which asserts that multiple levels of abstraction exist in conceptual 
knowledge, from sensory-motor information to schematic and abstract representations. The 
contribution of each level varies flexibly in accordance with numerous factors, encompassing 
task demands, contextual constraints, and familiarity. For example, van Dam and colleagues 
(2012) observed that the activity in motor brain areas elicited by action-related words strongly 
depended on the context in which the words were presented. More specifically, BOLD response 
in inferior parietal region increased when participants focused on the action versus perceptual 
features associated with a word’s referent object (e.g., tennis ball: play tennis versus yellow 
color). These results contrast the idea of a lexical entry invariably triggering a rigid semantic 
representation, and rather emphasize representational flexibility. Similarly, Hoenig et al. 
(2008) claimed that a variety of non-dominant object features can differentially contribute in 
conveying different nuances of meaning, while leaving the core meaning relatively unaffected. 
Familiarity is another key factor modulating the involvement of sensory-motor areas in 
conceptual processing, as less familiar concepts appear to be more dependent on detailed 
information encoded by modality-selective regions (Desai et al., 2011).
Category-specific semantic deficits, in which the identification of a category of items can be 
selectively damaged despite the relatively intact performance in other domains, have been 
particularly informative in unraveling the organization of conceptual knowledge in the 
human brain (Warrington, 1975; Capitani et al., 2003; Cree & McCrae, 2003). One of the earliest 
recognized neuropsychological dissociations was the one distinguishing living (e.g., animals, 
plants) from non-living (e.g., inanimate objects) semantic categories. For instance, patients 
with Alzheimer’s Disease generally show a spared performance with artifacts and non-living 
items, but a selective impairment with living entities (Silveri et al., 1991; Garrard et al., 1998; 
Chan et al., 2001; Catricalà et al., 2014). The opposite pattern, characterized by selectively 
impaired knowledge of artifacts, has been reported in cases of general brain atrophy (Moss 
et al., 2000) and cerebrovascular accidents (Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992). However, a note of 
caution has been raised against the generalization of these effects, claiming for the necessity 
of a more controlled analysis of the different tasks and stimuli employed in existing studies 
(Laws et al., 2005). Recent proposals suggested a continuum rather than a dichotomous 
distinction between living and non-living items. For example, Sha and colleagues (2015) 
proposed that a graded level of animacy discriminated between inanimate and animate 
entities, but then also between different animate exemplars, such as animals. In this view, 
higher animacy levels characterize those animals which more closely resemble the animate 
prototype of humans (e.g., monkeys), whereas the lower animacy bound encompasses the 
more phylogenetically distant ones (e.g., fishes). fMRI BOLD responses found in the ventral 
visual pathway mirrored this graded rather than dichotomous representational dimension for 
living and non-living entities (Sha et al., 2015). A related and more general assumption states 
that the core of category-specific semantic deficits does not reflect a true category impairment 
but encompasses impairments in the modalities and features which mostly contribute to the 
acquisition, storing, and identification of a certain domain of concepts (Nastase & Haxby, 
2017). For instance, greater importance of visual versus functional-motor information in the 
interaction with, respectively, animals and artifacts. In this view, categorical distinctions 
emerge as a complex combination of attributes.
Among non-living entities, manipulable objects have received particular attention, as 
several studies have been devoted to explore the constitutive dimensions that subtend their 
conceptual knowledge. The ability to use simple tools to extend motor skills constitutes 
2. Concepts in 
semantic memory
102
FRANCESCA CONCA, MARCO TETTAMANTI
a shared ability between humans and certain animals (Johnson-Frey, 2004). For instance, 
non-human primates generally use sticks to reach distant objects. However, in humans 
this ability has achieved the most sophisticated level of complexity. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Liepmann and colleagues (1900) first described cases of ideomotor apraxia, 
manifested as the inability to use everyday objects and attributed to a loss of knowledge 
about tools. In most patients, ideomotor apraxia is caused by lesions in left premotor and 
parietal cortices or results from the disconnection of the right from the left hemisphere 
after damage to the corpus callosum. More recently, neuroimaging techniques have begun to 
precisely describe the brain underpinnings that subtend tools-related knowledge. A recent 
meta-analysis by Ishibashi et al. (2016) differentiated the neural substrates mediating the 
identification of tools from those subtending planning and executing actions toward tools. The 
former involve the bilateral fusiform gyrus and the left occipito-temporal cortex, whereas the 
latter involve the left dorsal and ventral premotor cortices and the left superior and inferior 
parietal cortices. In particular, motor-based properties, coding for object-directed actions, are 
crucial in the semantic representation of manipulable objects. Viewing and naming pictures of 
tools, but not pictures of other categories (i.e. animals, faces, houses), entails brain activations 
in left ventral premotor and posterior parietal cortices (Chao & Martin, 2000), despite the 
absence of motor task requests. Canonical neurons, located in premotor-parietal circuits, 
constitute an anatomical basis for the visuo-motor encoding of tools. As affirmed by Rizzolatti 
et al. (2014): “...when an object is seen, the discharge of canonical neurons encode a potential 
motor act congruent with the properties of the presented object, independently of whether 
the act will be executed or not” (p. 667).
Two aspects of motor-based manipulability properties are usually distinguished (Salmon 
et al., 2010). The first one pertains to grasping, picking up, and lifting an object with one or 
both hands. This is the case with most manipulable artifacts, but can also occur with natural 
entities, for example small animals. The second one is the functional aspect of manipulability, 
which is coded independently of the object’s dimension. For example, a grand piano requires 
both hands to fulfill its specific function, in spite of the fact that we typically not interact 
with it by picking it up and lifting it by the hands. Generally, semantic representation of 
manipulable objects conjointly involve both aspects, but partially distinct neural bases subtend 
each of them. In a semantic categorization task performed during fMRI scanning, Canessa et al. 
(2007) asked participants to indicate whether a pair of manipulable man-made objects shared, 
respectively, the same action-related pattern (i.e. grasping properties) or the same function 
(i.e. context of use). Direct comparison highlighted selective activation for action-related 
judgment in a left fronto-parietal system encompassing intraparietal sulcus, rostral part of the 
inferior parietal lobule, and dorsal premotor cortex. Function-specific activation was found in 
retrosplenial and parahippocampal regions, extending to inferotemporal cortex.
Recently, several studies have begun to explore the role of personal experience and context in 
modulating the access to tools’ motor-based properties, both action- and function-related. 
Barsalou (1982) distinguished two types of properties in building conceptual representations 
and influencing the associations and similarities between concepts. On the one end, context-
independent properties refer to those features whose memory access is unaffected by 
contextual constrains. For example, distinguishing properties for a given category fall into this 
domain (e.g., gills are diagnostic properties for identifying fishes). Crucially, context-
independent properties include all the features that are particularly salient when people 
interact with the concept’s referent (e.g., the property of being edible is central in interacting 
with an apple). On the contrary, context-dependent properties are not part of the concept’s 
core meaning and constitute a source of variability in semantic representations, as they are 
only recruited in relevant contexts. For example, weight does not constitute a central 
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component in representing the meaning of a grand piano, but when we are required to move 
the grand piano, its weight becomes more salient than its functional properties and, 
consequently, we are more likely to perceive a stronger association between the grand piano 
and a couch compared to a guitar. Yee & Thomson-Schill (2016) claimed that conceptual 
knowledge is fluid and inextricably linked to specific contexts, which include for example 
long-term and recent experience, and the concurrent task demands. Although not directly 
referred to manipulable objects, several lines of research outlined the importance of personal 
long-term motor experience and acquired motor skills in modulating brain processes 
subtending action observation and representation. For example, in Calvo-Merino et al.’s fMRI 
study (2004), experts in classical ballet, experts in capoeira, and a group of inexpert controls 
viewed videos with actions taken from ballet and capoeira dances. The results suggested that 
the action observation system is tuned to the observer’s acquired motor repertoire. For 
instance, enhanced activations in premotor and superior parietal cortices, intraparietal sulcus, 
and superior temporal sulcus were found when experts viewed videos of their own dance 
style, whereas no differences emerged in inexpert controls. In a subsequent study, Calvo-
Merino et al. (2006) reported the impact of gender-specific expertise in influencing brain 
responses in classical ballet dancers. The authors compared brain activity when male and 
female participants viewed gender-specific movements (i.e. usually performed primarily by 
males or females dancers). Premotor, parietal, and cerebellar brain responses were selectively 
reported when participants viewed the movements which were specific of their own gender 
motor expertise. Other lines of research highlighted the structural brain changes induced by 
long-term motor expertise, possibly with a more direct link with tool-related knowledge. For 
example, Jäncke and colleagues (2009) explored the neuroanatomical reorganization in 
professional golfers by means of voxel-based morphometry. Playing golf requires the 
coordination of several movements of the upper and lower limbs, head and hips, also in 
relation to an instrument: precise hand postures and grips have to be adapted to the length, 
weight, and size of the different club types. In professional, high-proficiency golfers compared 
to naive participants, gray matter increases were found in a fronto-parietal network, 
comprising mainly dorsal premotor and posterior parietal cortices. Taken together, the 
aforementioned findings support the hypothesis that expertise and specific manipulation 
skills are capable of shaping the neural representation of a specific action type. One limitation 
of these studies, however, is that no direct causality can be established based on the mere 
association between motor skills and brain measures. To do so, one would require the 
possibility to monitor neural changes as they are shaped by the progressive acquisition of 
novel motor skills. At the structural brain level, this has been shown for instance by a 
longitudinal morphometry study in subjects required to learn juggling (Draganski et al., 2004), 
which induced gray matter volume increases in area hMT/V5 and in the posterior 
intraparietal sulcus. At the brain functional, semantic level, a methodological innovation has 
consisted in employing newly invented objects without similarities with existing tools, and 
thus not endowed with pre-existing memory representations, as experimental stimuli to 
directly assess the role of experience in building tool specific semantic knowledge. Weisberg et 
al. (2006), who first introduced this method, investigated whether manipulation experience 
acquired in a training session with novel objects induced activation increases in the fronto-
parieto-temporal neural system. In the motor training, participants learned the object’s 
function and were trained in the execution of specific actions associated with the objects (e.g., 
lifting a wooden block by means of the invented object). Two fMRI sessions were conducted, 
respectively, one before and one after training, during which the participants were presented 
with pictures of the trained objects and of control untrained objects in a visual perception 
task. Following training, enhanced brain activity was reported for trained versus untrained 
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objects in the middle temporal gyrus, posterior parietal cortex, and premotor cortex. Thus, 
tool-like experience with previously unencountered invented objects leads to the formation of 
a neural signature in semantic memory akin to that of real tools. A subsequent fMRI study by 
Bellebaum et al. (2013) aimed at disentangling the specific role of different types of experience 
in building semantic representations for novel tools. Participants were trained on different 
sets of novel tool objects with, respectively, a manipulation or a visual training. The former 
closely resembled the procedure applied by Weisberg and colleagues (2006), whereas the latter 
involved visually inspecting the novel objects without any direct or observed manipulation. 
Post-training increased activations were specifically found for manipulation versus visual 
experience in the left inferior/middle frontal gyrus and posterior parietal cortex, and for 
visual versus manipulation experience in the left middle temporal cortex. Effective 
connectivity analysis by means of Dynamical Causal Modelling in these brain regions revealed 
a fine-tuned combination of inter-regional modulatory effects, with an increase of connection 
strengths in regions specific to each experience type (fronto-parietal for manipulation, and 
temporal for visual experience), and a concomitant reciprocal decrease of experience type-
specific connection strengths (temporal for manipulation, and fronto-parietal for visual 
experience). These results suggest that the experience-dependent neural signature formation 
in semantic memory is not rigidly determined by the object’s physical properties, but very 
much depends on the type of interactions we gain with that object. In contrast to the 
previously mentioned studies (Weisberg et al., 2006; Bellebaum et al., 2013) and to other studies 
(Creem-Regehr et al., 2007; Cross et al., 2012), which involved direct manipulation of previously 
unencountered objects as an integral part of the training procedure, Rüther et al. (2014) 
demonstrated that even indirect manipulation experience, gained by observing another 
person interacting with a novel object, can promote semantic memory encoding in the 
sensorimotor system. Observed manipulation training, compared to visual training, 
specifically induced an activation increase in the left inferior frontal gyrus. These findings 
bear direct relevance to the observation-execution matching system implied in the 
evolutionary and developmental emergence of tool-related skills (Rizzolatti et al., 2014; 
Johnson-Frey, 2004). Taken together, the results just reviewed suggest that the neural 
representation of tools is progressively acquired and shaped according to the type of 
interactions that we directly or indirectly experience with them. Accordingly, functional and 
motor-related properties represent a constitutive component of the conceptual knowledge 
about tools.
Recently, Tettamanti et al. (2017) demonstrated that the visual appearance of a manipulable 
object, even when escaping perceptual awareness, entails activations in the action 
representation system. The authors selected colored photographs depicting manipulable and, 
as a control, non-manipulable objects matched for visual complexity (Brodeur et al., 2014). The 
authors adopted a Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS, Yang et al., 2014) paradigm in order 
to make the stimuli subliminal. In CFS stimulation, the experimental subjects wear anaglyph 
glasses, with a cyan-colored lens placed over their dominant eye and a red-colored lens 
over the non-dominant eye. This permits the selective presentation of, respectively, rapidly 
flashing mask images with a cyan hue to the dominant eye, and a target stationary picture 
with a red hue to the non-dominant eye. Below an individually tailored perceptual threshold, 
the conscious perception of the target stationary picture is suppressed by the rapidly flashing 
masks, thus effectively implementing subliminal stimulus presentation. The subjective level 
of target image perception was evaluated by requiring the participants to rate their degree 
of perception along a 4-points perceptual awareness scale (PAS; Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004). 
An objective control for the true absence of perception was provided by the inclusion of 
void stimuli (i.e. flashing masks but no target picture). Based on the individual perceptual 
105
CONCEPTUAL SEMANTICS AS GROUNDED IN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE
threshold, which was determined in a behavioral session prior to fMRI scanning, the authors 
used five incremental target picture contrast levels: two below, one equal to, and two above 
the individual perceptual threshold. The crucial issue was the evaluation of brain activations 
elicited by unaware processing of manipulable versus non-manipulable object pictures in a 
set of a priori selected brain regions, comprising a left-lateralized premotor-parietal network 
(Ishibashi et al., 2016). The results provided positive evidence showing that manipulable object 
pictures presented below contrast threshold and escaping subjective awareness significantly 
activated the targeted brain regions, including the ventral premotor cortex, the inferior and 
superior parietal cortices, and the lateral middle temporal gyrus. This result was further 
supported by a searchlight Multivariate Pattern Analysis (MVPA), showing that a supporting 
vector machine classifier was able to distinguish above chance level manipulable and non-
manipulable object pictures, presented below perceptual threshold and escaping subjective 
awareness. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that visuomotor coding represents a 
constitutive component of the conceptual knowledge about tools, one that is automatically 
activated by the visual perception of manipulable objects, even in the absence of awareness.
As shown by convergent evidence, the traditional language system comprises a set of core 
brain regions, mainly housed in inferior frontal and temporal cortices and also referred 
to as Broca and Wernicke areas, which contribute to a variety of linguistic functions, from 
comprehension to production (Friederici, 2011). In contrast, the role of additional brain 
regions in coding for specific semantic properties still remains controversial. According 
to embodied semantic theories, word meaning is coded in sensory-perceptual, motor, and 
emotion-related brain systems (Barsalou, 1999). For instance, words referring to entities with a 
strong relevance for color features (e.g., taxi, grass) elicit activations in brain regions involved 
in color perception, mainly located in the fusiform gyrus (Simmons et al., 2007), whereas 
reading odor-related words (e.g., garlic, cinnamon) produces brain activation in the olfactory 
cortex (Gonzalez et al., 2006). In addition, processing words with highly-relevant acoustic 
features (e.g., telephone) engages brain system for sound perception, encompassing the left 
posterior and middle temporal gyri (Kiefer et al., 2008). Extended work has similarly revealed 
that the elaboration of words indicating both actions (e.g., action verbs such as to grasp) and 
manipulable items (e.g., nouns referring to tools such as screwdriver) relies on the neural 
system subtending action execution and observation. Vitali et al. (2005) investigated functional 
connectivity during a semantic fluency task requiring the retrieval of nouns referring to 
tools, in one fMRI scan, and to animals, in another fMRI scan. Tool word generation was 
specifically associated with increased functional connectivity in a left-hemispheric network, 
encompassing the inferior frontal and premotor cortices, the inferior parietal lobule, and 
the temporo-occipital junction. Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) investigated whether words 
indicating objects associated with different kinds of manipulability elicited distinguishable 
neural responses. A main distinction was made between volumetrically manipulable objects 
(i.e. items that could be lifted and moved, such as clock) and functionally manipulable objects 
(i.e. items that had to be picked up to use, and were closer to the common description of tools, 
for example cup). The words were presented in a go/no-go lexical decision task performed 
within the MRI scanner. Whole-brain analysis yielded stronger activations for functionally 
compared to volumetrically manipulable objects in the fronto-parietal system, encompassing 
pre-supplementary motor area and inferior parietal lobule. No regions were more active in 
the opposite contrast. These findings indicated that the specific way in which an object is 
manipulated constitutes an integral part of the neural semantic representation of the word 
denoting it. More recently, Yang and colleagues (2011) designed a fMRI passive reading task, 
in which participants were presented with verbs indicating an action performed with the 
3. Concepts in 
language format
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hand (e.g., to touch) or an action that required the use of a tool (e.g., to cut). Both conditions, 
compared to rest, yielded similar activations in a left lateralized system, encompassing middle 
and inferior frontal gyri, inferior parietal lobule, and premotor cortex. Crucially, tool-related 
compared to hand-related verbs elicited stronger activation as well as greater functional 
connectivity in these fronto-parietal regions. In yet another study, nouns referring to tools 
yielded activations in the hand sector of the premotor area (Carota et al., 2012).
Different lines of research further emphasized the close link existing between the brain system 
mediating action and the comprehension of linguistic materials expressing an action-related 
content. Specifically, recent findings indicated the existence of interference effects exerted 
by the processing of words or sentences referring to both actions and manipulable entities on 
motor system activity. The study by Yee et al. (2013) suggested that the amount of interference 
in semantic tasks is proportional to the degree of motor practice with the object referents. 
Participants were engaged in a hand motion task, while they had to perform, respectively, a 
naming or an abstract/concrete categorization task. Each target word was also subjectively 
rated for the amount of manual experience generally associated with it. Crucially, the more 
manipulating experience with an object, the greater the interference effect between the 
motion task and both the concomitant semantic categorization and naming tasks. Moreover, 
Zarr et al. (2013) showed a motor system adaptation after reading sentences indicating actions 
carried out in the direction of the subject (e.g., Liam kicked the stone towards you) or in the 
opposite direction to it (e.g., You kicked the stone towards Liam). Participants were presented 
with a sentence, followed by a video showing an hand-object interaction, in which the object 
was placed in a container, respectively close to or distant from the volunteer’s body and that 
could be either congruent or incongruent with the movement described by the sentence. The 
task required to indicate, as accurately and quickly as possible, the moment when the object 
exceeded the container’s edge. Adaptation effects, with slower reaction times, were found 
when the sentence and the video were congruent (i.e. both referring to a movement in the 
same direction). Similarly, in the study of Marino et al. (2014), participants were presented 
with words indicating, respectively, graspable and non-graspable items and were instructed 
to press a button as soon as a change in the color of the square containing the words was 
detected. Slower motor responses were reported for graspable object words. The phenomenon 
was explained taking into account the recruitment of the motor system in accessing the 
conceptual-semantic representation of manipulable objects, leading to a reduced availability 
(i.e. interference) of the motor system itself for carrying out the behavioral response task. 
Other studies explored the desynchronization of the mu (8-13 Hz) brain wave rhythm, which 
is traditionally associated with the activation of the motor and premotor cortices elicited by 
executed or observed actions (Coudè et al., 2014). Moreno et al. (2015) investigated whether 
the mu desynchronization is also observed in processing sentences describing actions (e.g., 
You will cut the strawberry cake). Participants were presented with action-related, abstract, or 
perceptual-state-related sentences, while the EEG signal was recorded. A desynchronization 
of the mu rhythm was specifically found for sentences denoting actions, and it was confined to 
the fronto-central electrodes corresponding to the premotor cortex. Cattaneo et al. (2010) used 
state-dependent transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in order to investigate the causal 
role of the left ventral premotor cortex in representing tool-related words (e.g., scissors). 
Specifically, state-dependent TMS paradigms employ the interaction between the initial state 
of a neural population and the application of TMS pulses. The initial activation state was 
experimentally determined by means of a priming task. A differential TMS effect for primed 
versus non-primed trials could reveal neural specificity, indicating that the stimulated region 
is susceptible to the initial manipulation state (Silvanto et al., 2008). Specifically, Cattaneo 
and colleagues (2010) set the initial activation state of left ventral premotor cortex through 
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a priming task, in which the prime was a category name (tool or animal) and the participants 
were required to categorize a target word presented immediately after. When the target 
word belonged to the tool category, TMS applied over the ventral premotor cortex facilitated 
reaction times for incongruent compared to congruent primes. This finding supports the 
causal involvement of the left ventral premotor cortex in encoding tool word meanings. 
Consistent evidence demonstrates that the activity produced by action-related linguistic 
meanings in the premotor cortex reflects a somatotopic organization, mirroring the bodily 
effector’s homuncular motor maps. Somatotopically organized responses in the left premotor 
cortex were observed for isolated verbs referring to arm, face, and leg actions (e.g., to pick, to 
lick, to kick) in a fMRI passive reading task (Hauk et al., 2004), and in the selective interference 
exerted by TMS on differential premotor cortex sectors during a lexical decision task 
(Pulvermüller et al., 2005). Similar findings were reported by Tettamanti et al. (2005) during the 
auditory presentation of action-related sentences related to mouth (e.g., I bite an apple), hand 
(e.g., I grasp a knife), and leg (e.g., I kick the ball). More specifically, mouth-related sentences 
produced responses confined to the ventral-most sector, hand-related sentences in a medio-
dorsal sector, and leg-related sentences in the dorsal-most sector of the premotor cortex.
In contrast to words referring to concrete entities, abstract concepts are still largely 
unexplored and they are often assumed to rely on a linguistic-mediated definition (Hoffman, 
2015). Traditionally, concrete concepts refer to tangible items placed in the external world 
than can be directly experienced through the senses, a feature that cannot be applied to 
abstract concepts, which are not provided with physical referents. Concrete and abstract 
words can be differentiated along multiple psycholinguistic dimensions, including age of 
acquisition, familiarity, context availability, and imageability (Della Rosa et al., 2010). Recently, 
a growing body of studies systematically explored other distinguishing aspects and features 
lying at the core of abstract semantic meanings, in particular various kinds of experiential 
information. According to grounded cognition theories, experiential information is crucial 
for both concrete and abstract concepts, albeit operating in different ways: concrete concepts 
mainly rely on sensory-motor information, whereas abstract concepts mainly rely on 
introspective and inner state information (Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). This view is 
supported by a limited, but growing body of neuroimaging studies. Ghio & Tettamanti (2010) 
explored the functional integration between perisylvian language regions and modality-
specific brain regions involved in elaborating, respectively, action-related and abstract 
sentences. Using Dynamic Causal Modelling as a measure of functional integration, the authors 
found greater connection strengths for action-related versus abstract sentences in the left-
hemispheric action representation system, encompassing sensorimotor areas. In turn, abstract 
sentences selectively modulated the effective connectivity of temporal and inferior frontal 
regions with the retrosplenial cingulate cortex, a region of the default mode network which 
has indeed been implicated in internal state monitoring (Raichle, 2010), and conjoint mapping 
of internal and external spaces (Alexander & Nitz, 2015).
At a more fine-grained level of distinction among different types of abstract concepts, 
converging findings supported the role of affective, social, and magnitude information as 
relevant distinctive dimensions (Ghio et al., 2013; Troche et al., 2014, 2017), with the first two 
of them associated, respectively, with the anterior cingulate cortex (Vigliocco et al., 2014) and 
the superior anterior temporal lobe (Zahn et al., 2007), i.e. brain regions involved in emotion 
processing and social cognition. In turn, magnitude-related concepts encompass numerical-
arithmetical knowledge and linguistic terms roughly corresponding to quantity, time and 
space (Ghio et al., 2013; Troche et al., 2014, 2017). The intraparietal sulcus has been postulated 
as a potential neural basis supporting the processing of arithmetical concepts, given its role 
in representing numerical magnitude (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2013). Recently, by applying 
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MVPA to fMRI data, Ghio et al. (2016) found that inferior frontal gyrus and insular regions 
selectively contributed to the discrimination of fine-grained types of abstract (mental states-, 
emotion-, and mathematics-related) and concrete (mouth action-, hand action-, and leg 
action-related) concepts. Brain hubs in which conceptual-semantic information converges 
and maintains fine-grained, category-specific selectivity, such as the inferior frontal and the 
insular cortices, most likely operate by means of combined local anatomical specialization and 
large scale connections. Fine-grained connectivity-based parcellation within the insula region 
has been clearly demonstrated, with a tripartite subdivision into cognitive, affective, and 
sensorimotor selective modules (Chang et al., 2012).
Taken together, the aforementioned results provide compelling evidence that the neural 
representation subtending different semantic concepts expressed by linguistic stimuli is 
determined by the type of experience that we commonly have with the concepts’ referents. 
This experience may come from either the external world, in the case of action-related and 
tool concepts, or from introspective, emotion-related, and inner mental states, in the case of 
abstract concepts.
As we have seen, in the context of grounded cognition theories, the qualities and degrees 
of personal experience with objects, feelings, and facts play a major role in the formation of 
distinctive semantic memories. Studies that challenge experimentally the role of personal 
experience are therefore vital to provide the theories with solid bases. Beilock and colleagues 
(2008) explored whether the degree of individual experience in specific actions was capable of 
modulating the neural resources which subtended the comprehension of language describing 
the same action. Ice-hockey players, fans (without direct experience but with extensive 
hockey viewing) and novices (without direct or indirect experience) participated in the 
experiment. During fMRI, participants were acoustically presented with sentences describing, 
respectively, ice-hockey actions (e.g., The hockey player finished the stride) and common 
everyday actions (e.g., The individual pushed the bell). Following each sentence, a picture was 
displayed and participants had to indicate whether it correctly matched the sentence by 
button press. As for everyday actions, all the three groups of participants responded faster 
to the pictures that matched the sentences, compared to those pictures that did not. In 
contrast, only ice-hockey players and fans showed a similar facilitatory effect for hockey-
related sentences. The authors next explored whether the brain regions involved in sentence 
comprehension were also related to hockey experience. Specifically, activity within left dorsal 
premotor cortex positively correlated with hockey experience, and, in turn, bilateral dorsal 
primary sensory-motor cortex displayed a negative correlation. These findings provided 
evidence that individual sport experience influences action-specific language comprehension. 
Although remarkable, Beilock et al.’s (2008) study was characterized by a cross-sectional 
comparison between different populations (i.e. players, fans, novices), a feature that does not 
allow to draw strong conclusions as to the decisive role of motor experience, as opposed to 
other types of experiences (e.g., specialistic language use) or even individual predispositions 
leading to greater search and accumulation of motor experience. To overcome these 
limitations, a longitudinal study by Locatelli et al. (2012) was designed to train participants 
in performing previously unencountered manual actions, and to assess semantic language 
performance in pre and post training sessions. Over a period of three weeks, participants were 
trained in three different manual actions (e.g., origami, prestidigitation, tying sailors’ knots). 
Before and after training they were tested on a semantic congruency task, similar to Beilock et 
al.’s (2008) study. Sentences and pictures could be congruent or incongruent and either related 
or unrelated to the trained actions. Reaction times of both trained and untrained congruent 
trials significantly decreased after compared to before training. Noteworthy, however, the 
post training reduction of reaction times was greater for trained compared to untrained 
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action-related concepts. The results suggested that manual expertise leads to an improvement 
in semantic processing specifically for concepts related to trained actions.
Since we rarely use abstract or concrete words in isolation, but rather use them in 
combination with other words in sentences and discourse, a crucial matter of investigation is 
how linguistic structure shapes semantic composition and the underlying neural dynamics. In 
the context of embodied and grounded cognition theories, a prototypical example, which we 
will only superficially deal with here, is that of figurative action-related expressions, as in the 
contrast between I grasp the knife, with a clear reference to motor action (i.e. prehend), versus 
I grasp the idea, in which a more metaphorical, abstract meaning is conveyed (i.e. comprehend). 
The complexity and diversity of figurative language constructions (e.g., metaphors, idioms, 
fictive motion expressions), diverging for global meaning access versus lexical decomposition, 
has not permitted until now to reach a general consensus with respect to the involvement of 
experience-dependent sensory-motor systems (for a review, see Ghio & Tettamanti, 2015).
A further quite interesting example of linguistic structural composition, which has recently 
fallen under increased scrutiny in the field of grounded cognition, is that of sentential 
negation. Sentential negation is a property embedded in syntactic structure, which is able to 
reverse the truth value of a declarative sentence (Horn, 1989; MacDonald & Just, 1989). The 
neural underpinnings subtending syntactic negation are still largely unexplored, although in 
previous years several psycholinguistic studies have been devoted to unravel how negation 
affects the processing of meanings. Several mental computations are required to understand 
linguistic utterances that include a negation marker such as no or not. Specifically, negation 
has to be linked to the mental representation of the concept or scope on which it operates. 
In sentence-picture matching tasks, longer reaction times have been traditionally found for 
negative (e.g., The dots aren’t red) compared to affirmative (e.g., The dots are black) sentences 
(Just & Carpenter, 1971). Early proposals interpreted these effects as evidence that negated 
information is more difficult to process and requires additional computational resources 
than its affirmative counterpart. Subsequently, other approaches have also suggested that 
negation reduces the mental accessibility of the meanings expressed in its scope. MacDonald 
& Just (1989) investigated in three behavioral experiments the effects of negation during 
noun processing. In the first experiment, participants were presented with simple sentences 
containing a negation (e.g., Almost every weekend, Elizabeth bakes no bread but only cookies for the 
children) and were required to judge the truth value of a verification statement (e.g., Elizabeth 
bakes cookies for the children). Response times to negated nouns target were slower compared to 
non-negated ones. Similar results were obtained in the second and third experiments, where 
the interference effect of negation was investigated in naming tasks. The authors suggested 
that negating a noun exerts an influence on its semantic representation and, more specifically, 
reduces the strength of activation of the concept representation.
This body of behavioral observations led Tettamanti et al. (2008) to make predictions on the 
neural effects of negation on the semantic representation of action-related meanings from 
a grounded cognition perspective. These predictions were tested in an fMRI study involving 
sentential negation in a passive-listening task. The experimental stimuli were sentences 
characterized by the manipulation of negation polarity (i.e. negative vs. affirmative) and 
semantic concreteness (i.e. abstract, for example: Now I appreciate loyalty, vs. concrete, action-
related, for example: Now I push the button). Independently of the level of concreteness, 
negative sentences compared to affirmative ones, yielded stronger inhibitory deactivations 
in the right middle frontal gyrus, right middle occipital gyrus, and left pallidum. As a main 
effect of concreteness, action-related sentences induced widespread activation in the left 
hemispheric fronto-parieto-temporal network underlying action representation, whereas 
abstract sentences yielded stronger brain responses in the left ventral inferior frontal gyrus, 
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in the inferior and middle temporal gyri, and in the posterior cingulate cortex. Crucially, the 
interaction between polarity and concreteness yielded significant modulatory effects in both 
networks, revealing a semantic category-specific BOLD signal reduction for negative compared 
to affirmative sentences. As for negative abstract sentences, an activity reduction was found 
in the posterior cingulate cortex, whereas for negative action-related sentences the reduced 
responses encompassed the left fronto-parieto-temporal network. Functional connectivity 
tested in the left fronto-parieto-temporal network by means of Dynamic Causal Modelling 
showed a significant reduction of connection strengths (i.e. of functional integration) specific 
for negative versus affirmative action-related sentences. These findings suggested a reduced 
access to the negated semantic information coded in experience-dependent, category-specific 
grounded representations, and led the authors to propose a “disembodiment effect” for 
sentential negation (Bartoli et al., 2013). Subsequent experiments provided further evidence 
in support of this proposal. For instance, Tomasino et al. (2010) found that neural activity 
in the bilateral motor and premotor cortices was reduced when imperative verbs were 
presented in negative (e.g., Don’t write!) compared to affirmative form (e.g., Write!). In a similar 
vein, Liuzza and colleagues (2011) applied paired-pulses Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
to the primary motor cortex, which at baseline exerts a facilitatory motor effect that is 
revealed by an increased amplitude of motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) in peripheral muscles. 
Simultaneously, participants were required to perform a passive reading task, including either 
abstract or hand-action related sentences, in both negative and affirmative forms. Crucially, 
reading action-related affirmative sentences suppressed MEPs, whereas this effect was absent 
for action-related negative sentences. The aforementioned results were recently corroborated 
by Bartoli et al. (2013), who tested the simultaneous recruitment of shared neural resources 
by semantic and motor tasks. The authors measured proximal (i.e. reach) and distal (i.e. 
grasp) upper limb movement kinematics during a motor task with simultaneous presentation 
of action-related sentences, including, respectively, either proximal (e.g., I grasp) or distal 
(e.g., I pinch) arm movements, in both affirmative and negative forms. Crucially, sentences 
describing actions in the negative, compared to the affirmative form exerted less interfering 
effects on kinematic parameters in the congruent conditions (e.g., proximal movement with 
proximal action-related negative sentence). These findings suggested that the comprehension 
of negative action-related sentences is characterized by a reduced computational load in 
embodied conceptual representations which, in turn, leaves more neural resources available 
to perform the concurrent motor task.
Far-reaching progress across all branches of the modern neurosciences has revealed the 
remarkable plasticity of the brain, as a learning organ that adaptively responds across 
the lifetime to stimuli, sensations, and experiences, and even insults. Evidence of brain 
plasticity confutes the view of the brain as an isolated, central storage and calculation 
machine, disconnected from the rest of the body and from the external world. In turn, it 
promotes a view of life as an integrated mind and body experience that is deeply rooted in 
the physical, social, and cultural environment. At the cognitive level, grounded cognition 
theories emphasize such plastic brain-body-environment integration, leading to a view of our 
mnemonic, linguistic, and more in general intellectual abilities as the product of our lifetime 
personal experiences, which ultimately shape our uniqueness as individuals.
4. Conclusions
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